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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order suppressing evidence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Christopher Jacob Martinez with felony possession of
methamphetamine and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 59-60.)
The state also charged an enhancement for being a persistent violator. (R., pp. 85-86.)
Martinez filed a motion to suppress. (R., p. 110.)
The district court found that officers pulled over a car for failing to signal a righthand turn and contacted the two occupants of the car. (R., p. 147.) Martinez was the
passenger, and one of the officers had “‘dealt with him before.’” (R., pp. 147-48.) One of
the officers “instructed [Martinez] to either get back into the vehicle for the remainder of
the stop, or to go stand on the sidewalk by the convenience store.” (R., p. 148.) Martinez
“chose to stand near the convenience store.” (Id.) The driver informed officers that she
was on parole for a drug-related conviction. (Id.) The officers decided to bring in a drug
detection dog. (Id.)
The driver also admitted her driver’s license was suspended. (R., p. 149.) The
officers told her driving without privileges is an arrestable offense and patted her down for
weapons. (Id.) Both the driver and Martinez became very upset at this turn of events, and
one of the officers warned Martinez that he would be arrested for interfering in an
investigation if he “started talking again.” (Id.) Officers placed the driver in handcuffs.
(Id.)
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One of the officers began writing a citation. (R., p. 150.) A little over two and onehalf minutes later a third officer, a canine handler, arrived. (Id.) The officer writing the
citation talked to the canine officer for at least 30 seconds. (R., pp. 150-51.) He then
returned to writing the citation. (Id.) Within about four minutes of the dog’s arrival it had
conducted an open-air sniff around the car and alerted “several times.” (R., p. 151.)
Officers searched the car and found methamphetamine and other evidence. (Id.)
The district court granted the suppression motion, concluding that Martinez had
“standing” (R., p. 153); that the traffic stop was unlawfully extended (R., pp. 154-59); that
the discovery of the evidence was not inevitable (R., pp. 160-62); and that the discovery of
the evidence was not attenuated (R., pp. 162-65). The state filed a notice of appeal 27 days
later. (R., pp. 177-79.)

2

ISSUES
1.
Did the district court err by concluding the police abandoned the traffic stop by
having a short conversation unrelated to the purposes of that stop?
2.
Did the district court err when it applied the exclusionary rule under the facts of
this case?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Police Did Not Abandon The Traffic Stop By Having A Short Conversation
Unrelated To The Purposes Of That Stop
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that the officer writing the traffic ticket stopped doing

so to have a brief conversation with the third officer upon his arrival to the scene. (R., p.
150.) The conversation related to whether the first officer was writing a citation and that
the third officer needed to be aware of Martinez standing at the edge of the parking lot.
(R., p. 150; Exhibit C, first video at 9:20-9:27; Tr., p. 25, Ls. 12-25.) The third officer then
ran his dog around the stopped car while the first officer resumed writing the citation. (R.,
pp. 150-51; Exhibit C, second video at 0:00-0:30.)
The district court concluded that “the most probable inference is that the
conversation concerned the drug investigation and deploying the drug dog,” but that
“[r]egardless of the topic of conversation,” the first officer “deviated from the purpose of
the traffic stop (i.e. a citation for failing to signal) in order to coordinate with [the third
officer] to effectuate a drug investigation.” (R., p. 157.) The district court erred because
it was not a deviation from the purposes of the stop to inform the third officer arriving on
the scene about the basic situation the officers confronted.

B.

Standard Of Review
“When this Court reviews an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, it

accepts the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Zueger,
143 Idaho 647, 649, 152 P.3d 8, 10 (2006). However, the appellate court “freely reviews

4

the application of constitutional principles to those facts.” State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,
302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

C.

Explaining The Situation To The Third Officer Did Not Deviate From The
Purposes Of The Traffic Stop
“Because a routine traffic stop is normally limited in scope and of short duration, it

is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest and therefore is
analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).” State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App.
2003). “Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible
criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being
driven contrary to traffic laws.” State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct.
App. 2004). A “drug dog sniff is not a search and therefore may be done during a traffic
stop without reasonable suspicion of drug activity.” State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 563,
112 P.3d 848, 851 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)).
“An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop.” State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 889, 187 P.3d 1261,
1264 (Ct. App. 2008). “Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose.” Rodriguez v. United States,
___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015) (internal quotes, brackets and citations omitted).
Addressing the infraction includes “address[ing] the traffic violation that warranted the
stop” and “attend[ing] to related safety concerns.” Id. “The stop remains a reasonable
seizure while the officer diligently pursues the purpose of the stop, to which that reasonable
suspicion is related. However, should the officer abandon the purpose of the stop, the
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officer no longer has that original reasonable suspicion supporting his actions.” State v.
Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016).
In this case the district court concluded the first officer “deviated from the purpose
of the traffic stop (i.e. a citation for failing to signal) in order to coordinate with [the third
officer] to effectuate a drug investigation.” (R., p. 157.) Application of the relevant legal
standards shows that such “coordination” as happened here did not exceed the scope of the
traffic stop.
“[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500
(1983).

“[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is

determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the
stop, and attend to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez, ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S.Ct. at 1614.
“Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or
reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. “In assessing whether a detention is too
long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to
examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the
defendant.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).
In this case the first officer took a short time to inform the third officer of the
relevant facts regarding the situation then presented. (R., p. 150; Exhibit C, first video at
9:20-9:27; Tr., p. 25, Ls. 12-25.) One officer informing another officer at the scene about
relevant information related to the stop was not a “deviation” nor an “abandonment” of the
traffic investigation. Unlike in Linze, the officer conducting the traffic stop did not
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participate in the drug investigation. Rather, he continued writing the citation while the
third officer walked the drug dog around the car. Because officer safety is within the scope
of the mission of the traffic stop, the brief discussion between officers concerning the
circumstances being confronted by the officers prior to the deployment of the drug dog was
not a deviation from or abandonment of the purposes of the traffic stop.

II.
The District Court Erred By Concluding Evidence Found Was Subject To The
Exclusionary Rule
A.

Introduction
The district court also concluded that the evidence found in the car was subject to

exclusion because of the found illegality. (R., pp. 160-65.) Even if the court were correct
in finding a short deviation from the purposes of the traffic stop that violated the Fourth
Amendment, it erred when it concluded that required suppression of the evidence found in
the car.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts

the trial court’s findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418,
337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014).

C.

The Evidence Was Not Found By Exploitation Of The Short Delay
“The exclusionary rule is the judicial remedy for addressing illegal searches and

bars the admission or use of evidence gathered pursuant to the illegal search.” State v.
Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915, 136 P.3d 379, 386 (Ct. App. 2006). “The United States
7

Supreme Court has articulated the three exceptions” to the exclusionary rule, “independent
origin, inevitable discovery, and attenuated basis.” Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36
P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001). The question underlying all three exceptions “is whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488 (1963) (internal quotation omitted). In this case both the inevitable discovery and
attenuation exceptions to the exclusionary rule show that officers did not acquire the
evidence in question by exploitation of the illegality found by the district court.
First, the inevitable discovery rule applies. The inevitable discovery doctrine
makes suppression of evidence improper where, even if the evidence was actually obtained
by constitutionally improper means, the prosecution establishes by a preponderance of
proof that the evidence inevitably would have been found by lawful means. Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); Stuart, 136 Idaho at 497-98, 36 P.3d at 1285-86. The
underlying rationale of this rule is that suppression should leave the prosecution in the same
position it would have been absent the police misconduct, not a worse one. Nix, 467 U.S.
at 442-44; State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 102, 57 P.3d 807, 813 (Ct. App. 2002).
The illegality found by the district court was a short deviation from the traffic stop
that ended prior to the initiation of the dog sniff. The brief illegality in the detention did
not have any connection with the probable cause generated by the dog alert. Indeed,
because neither the driver nor the passenger were licensed drivers, the illegal portion of the
detention, no more than about two minutes, had nothing to do with the presence of the
vehicle for the dog sniff. The dog sniff and resulting probable cause were ultimately
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untainted by the illegality found because that illegal detention was not responsible for the
presence or immobility of the car.
The district court stated that “the issue is whether an additional line of investigation
would have revealed the methamphetamine.” (R., p. 161.) Although an additional line of
investigation certainly could result in application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, the
district court erred as a matter of law because there is no requirement that inevitable
discovery must arise from an additional line of investigation. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at
102, 57 P.3d at 813 (“We therefore hold that a wholly independent investigation, while
certainly relevant to whether discovery was inevitable, is not a prerequisite to application
of the inevitable discovery exception.”). See
also -----Bunting, 142 Idaho at 916, 136 P.3d at
- --387 (“The valid search warrant does not have to arise out of an investigation independent
from the one that resulted in the unlawful discovery of evidence for the inevitable discovery
exception to apply.”). The circumstances leading to inevitable discovery “need not be the
result of a wholly independent investigation,” but need only be “the result of some action
that actually took place (or was in the process of taking place) that would inevitably have
led to the discovery of the unlawfully obtained evidence.” State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho
784, 787, 352 P.3d 506, 509 (Ct. App. 2015).
The district court erred when it applied an incorrect legal standard. Application of
the correct legal standard shows that discovery of the evidence as a result of the drug dog
sniff was inevitable regardless of whether the short conversation between the officers
extended the stop for up to two minutes. The drug dog sniff was an action that actually
took place and inevitably would have led to the discovery of the evidence regardless of the
less-than-two-minute deviation from the purposes of the traffic stop. Thus, even assuming
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that the short conversation between the traffic and drug dog officers was an illegal
deviation from the traffic stop, the evidence would have been inevitably discovered and
was not properly suppressed by the district court.
Second, the attenuation exception applies in this case. The Idaho Supreme Court
has adopted a three-factor test for application of the attenuation exception. See State v.
Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004). The factors to be considered are: “(1)
the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the
occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper
law enforcement action.” Id. (citation omitted). Not all of these factors must be resolved
in favor of the state before evidence will be deemed not subject to the exclusionary
rule. State v. Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 549, 6 P.3d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 2000). “The
test only requires a balancing of the relative weights of all the factors, viewed together, in
order to determine if the police exploited an illegality to discover evidence.” Id. (citing
United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 549-550 (4th Cir. 1998)).
In this case there were only a few minutes between the short conversation that the
district court concluded was a deviation from the traffic stop and the discovery of the
evidence in the car. However, there was an intervening circumstance of the drug dog
alerting and thus providing probable cause to search the car, and the officers’ conduct in
holding a short conversation was not flagrant because there is no reason to conclude that
the officers were deliberately extending the stop in order to conduct a dog sniff that
otherwise could not have been conducted. Thus, the attenuation exception applies and
suppression of evidence was erroneous.
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Here the district court correctly concluded that the time between the short
conversation and the discovery of the contraband weighed against attenuation, but its
conclusions that there were no intervening circumstances and that the officers flagrantly
violated Martinez’s rights (R., pp. 162-64) do not withstand analysis under the relevant
legal standards.
Here the dog alert was an intervening circumstance because it was not caused by
the allegedly improper deviation from the traffic stop. Attenuation can occur “when the
causal connection is remote.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006). In United
States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 100 (3rd Cir. 2002), the court had “difficulty fathoming how
the canine sniff is the result of the exploitation of [Defendant’s] allegedly illegal arrest”
where he walked away from the car before being seized. Likewise, where officers were
going to run a drug dog on a trailer regardless of the presence of the defendants,
“defendants’ detention did not cause the government’s discovery of the challenged
evidence” and the discovery of drugs was by means sufficiently distinguishable from any
illegal detention. United States v. Figueredo-Diaz, 718 F.3d 568, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2013)
(emphasis original). See
also ---------------United States v. Rendon, 462 Fed.Appx. 923, 926-27 (11th
- --Cir.) (drug dog sniff not tainted by illegal entry into trailer where there was “no connection”
between the illegal searches and the ultimate alert by the dog). The deviation from the
traffic stop as found by the district court both started and concluded before the dog alerted.
The alert was in no sense caused by the deviation. Indeed, it can hardly be argued that the
deviation did not delay the alert itself. Because the deviation from the purpose of the stop
did not make the alert possible, the dog alert was not tainted by the illegality found, and
the district court erred by not finding the alert to be an intervening circumstance.
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The district court also erred when it concluded the officers’ conduct was flagrant.
(R., p. 164.) The court reasoned that the officers conducted a “drug investigation from the
moment the officers learned the driver was on parole for a prior drug offense” because they
called in a drug dog based solely on that information. (R., p. 164.) However, in Utah v.
Strieff, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016), the officer stopped Strieff for the sole
reason of investigating why he was at a drug house. The Supreme Court of the United
States concluded the officer “was at most negligent.” Id. at 2063. The district court’s
conclusion that the officers’ conduct was flagrant because they were investigating drugs is
completely incompatible with this precedent, and the district court’s analysis would result
in all Fourth Amendment violations being flagrant. Even assuming a diversion of up to
two minutes in the course of a traffic stop resulted in a Fourth Amendment violation, the
officers’ “errors in judgment hardly rise to a purposeful or flagrant violation of [Martinez]’s
Fourth Amendment rights.” Id.
The district court applied legally erroneous standards when it concluded that
suppression of the evidence found as a result of the dog alert was the proper remedy.
Application of the proper legal standards shows that the discovery of the evidence was not
found by exploitation of the illegality under either the attenuation or the inevitable
discovery exceptions.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order
suppressing evidence and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of January, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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